If the reference to erga omnes in the Prespa agreement does not concern an obligation imposed on all third parties to recognize the new official name of Northern Macedonia, one might assume that it refers to the famous diktat of the Barcelona Traction case, according to which obligations to the international community as a whole are the concern of all States and that all States „can therefore have a legal interest in their protection”.  This is what was done in Section 48 of the articles relating to state responsibility, which recognizes the obligation of all States to invoke the responsibility of a state for breaching an obligation due to the international community as a whole, and to request an end to unlawful conduct, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, as well as reparation in the interests of the aggrieved state or beneficiaries of the leesiferous undertaking.  The issue of collective application has already been raised with respect to objective status/rules contracts in the ILC`s work on treaty law, in which the draft article 63, paragraph 3, point b), Waldock`s third report to the ILC stipulated that third countries „have the right to invoke the provisions of the general regime and to exercise a common law that they can grant.”  It is therefore clear that, under this prism, the Erga omnes no longer results in an obligation imposed on all third parties, but on a general interest granted to them „when a contractual scheme is imposed”.  In other words, it becomes an invitation to „participate in the collective affirmation of the values that characterize international public order.”  This is a transfer of the impact of contracts to third parties to its final recourse to liability for violations of these rules. But nothing in Prespa`s agreement starts from such a reading. Not only does Article 20, paragraph 7 limit the potential for third-party effects, but Article 19 on the Peaceful Settlement also does not mention the possibility for third countries to raise issues relating to compliance with the agreement. The same is true of Article 1, paragraph 13, in which only the parties can require corrections of errors and errors concerning the official name of the second part. Therefore, if there is an erga omnes obligation, it is an erga omnes partes one , which appears to be a bad name in the case of a bilateral treaty. In other words, only Greece can rely on the lack of diligence on the part of Northern Macedonia to ensure that third parties use the new official name.  And this duty of care is remarkably low, as it will manifest now.
Prior to the Prespa agreement, international organizations provisionally designated the Republic of Macedonia as the „former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (sometimes abbreviated by FYROM). The public`s uncompromising attitude to the name dispute can be explained by at least three main reasons. First, while the „Macedonian question” has been on the agenda for almost thirty years, there has never been a serious debate in the country to inform people of what is really at stake. Emotional arguments and historical evidence about the origins of ancient Macedonia have crystallized any discussion of the nature of litigation in modern times. Moreover, the decision of most Greek political parties in 2007 to move to a more conciliatory position and to advocate their support for a compromise solution was not sufficiently explained to the citizens. The second reason is the context of a decades-long economic crisis in which many people feel they have already paid too high a price materially and symbolically. In this regard, the compromise on the name was seen by many frustrated people as an additional insult to the violation. The fact that Greece`s Euro-Atlantic partners have unequivocally supported the agreement has inadvertently confirmed the perception of many that the agreement serves international interests more than Greek interests.